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Sanity in Alaska:
A Constitutional Assessment of the
Insanity Defense Statute
I. INTRODUCrION
In 1982, Alaska adopted a new statutory standard for its
insanity defense. While many other states have done likewise,
Alaska's new standard is the most stringent in the nation. This note
will assess the constitutionality of Alaska's revised insanity defense
standard. Part II of this note will review the history of Alaska's
current insanity defense statute. Part III will examine the constitu-
tionality of various insanity defense standards. Part IV will argue
that Alaska's current insanity statute, with its restrictive insanity
standard, violates due process and should therefore be substantially
amended or repealed.
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1. Some scholars have argued that the Eighth Amendment's proscription
against cruel and unusual punishment prohibits the elimination of all or part of the
traditional insanity defense. However, because due process concerns bear directly
upon the standard actually used to determine insanity, this note will focus solely on
the argument that Alaska's insanity defense statute violates the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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II. ALASKA'S CURRENT INsANITY DEFENSE STANDARD
A. The Development of Alaska's Insanity Defense
When John Hinckley was found not guilty by reason of insanity
in 1982 for the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan,
many states reacted by narrowing their insanity defense statutes.
While this event fueled calls for reform in Alaska, a second incident,
occurring a year later, sparked additional demand for reform.
Charles Meach, a patient on release from the Alaska Psychiatric
Institute, murdered four teenagers. Meach had previously been
found not guilty by reason of insanity and had been incarcerated for
treatment at the institute.2 The Alaska Legislature responded to
these events by: (1) narrowing the definition of insanity used to
exonerate defendants from criminal responsibility,3 (2) placing the
burden of proving insanity on the defendant,' and (3) creating the
increasingly-popular "guilty but mentally ill" ("GBMI") verdict.5
Historically, states have adopted one of several different
standards for their insanity defenses. The first and still the most
common method arose from an early English case known as
M'Naghten's Case.6 M'Naghten established the insanity standard
known as the "right-wrong" test. Under this test, no criminal
responsibility can be assigned to a defendant who was "labouring
2. See generally Suzan E. DeBusk, Note, Alaska's Insanity Defense and the
"Guilty But Mentally Ill" Verdict, 4 ALASKA L. REV. 171, 171 n.2 (1987). DeBusk
argued that the present insanity definition is constitutionally sound. Id. at 177-81.
DeBusk's argument, however, is no longer persuasive because it preceded the
Alaska Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of the current insanity defense.
See infra text accompanying notes 25-31. DeBusk also concluded, however, that
Alaska's insanity defense would be constitutionally sound even under a narrow
interpretation, DeBusk at 181, basing her argument on State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992
(Mont. 1984), a Montana Supreme Court decision upholding the abolition of the
insanity defense. But see infra text accompanying notes 99-106 (arguing that Korell
is not persuasive).
3. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010 (1990).
4. Id § 12.47.010(a).
5. See id. § 12.47.030. Whereas under a "not guilty by reason of insanity"
("NGRI") verdict, the defendant is actually acquitted, a GBMI verdict has
consequences similar to a "guilty" verdict. The defendant is subjected to the same
jail sentence as a guilty defendant. The only difference is that the state is required
to provide psychiatric treatment for the GBMI defendant. DeBusk, supra note 2,
at 172.
6. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
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under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."7
This standard exonerates defendants who are cognitively impaired.
A cognitive defect is "understood as a disorder that undermines a
person's ability to perceive reality accurately."'
Developments in psychiatry prompted some states to supple-
ment the M'Naghten test with an "irresistible impulse" test,9 which
exonerates those defendants who, because of a mental impairment,
are unable to control their conduct." Years later, the American
Law Institute ("ALI") set forth its recommended definition of
insanity in the Model Penal Code." Under the ALI standard, a
defendant is excused from criminal responsibility if "at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect [the defendant]
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality... of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law."12  The first prong of the ALI test is a variation of the
M'Naghten standard; the second prong - commonly referred to as
the "volitional" prong - is similar to the "irresistible impulse" test
in that it exonerates defendants suffering from defects of control.
Although different in form, these tests all reflect a fundamental
tenet of the criminal justice system: that "a certain level of moral
and rational thought is necessary to hold a person criminally
responsible for a crime."' 3
Prior to the Alaska Legislature's reform of the insanity laws,
Alaska had adopted the ALI insanity standard. 4 Under Alaska's
version of the ALI standard, defendants who "lack[ed] substantial
capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of [their] conduct or
to conform [their] conduct to the requirements of law"1" were to
be found not guilty by reason of insanity.
7. Id. at 722.
8. Jodie English, The Light Between Twilight and Dusk- Federal Criminal Law
and the Volitional Insanity Defense, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 2 (1988).
9. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
10. Juliet L. Ream, Capital Punishment for Mentally Retarded Offenders: Is it
Morally and Constitutionally Impermissible?, 19 Sw. U. L. REv. 89, 119 (1990).
11. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1985).
12. Id.
13. See People v. Bieber, 835 P.2d 542, 550 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (Dubofsky,
J., dissenting).
14. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.083 (1972) (repealed 1982).
15. Id.
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Under the current statute, however, a defendant meeting this
prior definition would be found guilty but mentally ill rather than
not guilty by reason of insanity. 6 To be deemed not guilty by
reason of insanity, the defendant must now show that, at the time
of the crime, he or she "was unable, as a result of mental disease or
defect, to appreciate the nature and quality of [the] conduct."17
This new definition of insanity does not exculpate a defendant
for volitional impairment, but only' for cognitive impairment. Yet
the test is more than a mere retreat to the M'Naghten standard.
Unlike M'Naghten, Alaska's standard does not provide for exonera-
tion based on the defendant's ability to distinguish between right
and wrong. Exculpation is based solely upon whether the defendant
16. See id. § 12.47.030 (1990). The GBMI standard is identical to the old NGRI
standard: "A defendant is guilty but mentally ill if... the defendant lacked.., the
substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of that conduct or to
conform that conduct to the requirements of law." Id. In other words, the level
of insanity that previously resulted in an acquittal now results in a guilty verdict.
The Alaska Court of Appeals explained the change as follows:
In summary, if we assume that three distinct classes of individuals are
exempted from criminal responsibility under the A.L.I. test - first, those
who were unable as a result of mental disease or defect to appreciate the
nature and quality of their conduct; second, those who by virtue of mental
disease or defect were unable to appreciate that their acts were wrong; and
third, those who knew what they were doing and knew that it was wrong,
but nevertheless were irresistibly impelled to perform the act - only the
first is now expressly exempt from criminal responsibility under Alaska
law. The latter two categories are guilty but mentally ill.
Hart v. State, 702 P.2d 651, 658 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). Under the old
statute, all three categories of defendants would have been exempt
from criminal responsibility. See supra text accompanying note 15.
17. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010(a) (1990) (emphasis added). The statute further
provides that "[e]vidence of a mental disease or defect that is manifested only by
repeated criminal or other antisocial conduct is not sufficient to establish the
affirmative defense under (a) of this section." Id. § 12.47.010(c).
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was able to "appreciate" the actual act committed."8 The Alaska
Court of Appeals has phrased the standard as follows:
To "appreciate" the nature and quality of an act means to
understand or comprehend the act. A person is "unable to
appreciate the nature and quality of his conduct" for purposes
of the insanity defense if, because of mental disease or defect, he
did not understand that he was performing the acts which are
part of the crime with which he is charged .... "[K]nowing"
that you are engaging in conduct is apparently the same as
understanding or appreciating the nature of that conduct.19
The legislative history of the statute is remarkably clear. The
House Journal report on the enactment of this section states that
the legislature intended to adopt only one element of the M'Naghten
test.' The legislature rejected the "right-wrong" element of
M'Naghten which required a defendant to appreciate the wrongful-
ness of his or her conduct in order to be held responsible for the
crime.2' The report recognized that the new definition of insanity
would limit the defense "to persons suffering from the most extreme
forms of mental illness."'  The report even included examples of
the types of defendants that may be able to successfully raise an
insanity defense under the new standard:
A person who could successfully establish the elements of the
revised insanity defense is the defendant who, as a result of a
mental disease or defect is unable to realize that he is shooting
someone with a gun when he pulls the trigger on what he
believes to be a water pistol, or a murder defendant who
believes he is attacking the ghost of his mother rather than a
18. The Alaska statute gauges the defendant's ability "to appreciate the nature
and quality of that conduct." IL § 12.47.010(a). This language is susceptible to
varying interpretations: "[k]nowing the nature and quality of an act can refer to the
physical aspects of an act - for example, whether the defendant knows he is firing
a gun - or it can refer to all aspects of an act including its likely consequences to
the actor and others." Hart v. State, 702 P.2d 651, 654 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
The Alaska Supreme Court, in State v. Patterson, 740 P.2d 944 (Alaska 1987),
adopted the more restrictive interpretation. Id at 949 (holding "that AS
12.47.010(a) enacts only the first prong of the M'Naghten test"). In an earlier case,
however, the Alaska Supreme Court had recognized that similar language could be
interpreted to encompass a right-wrong assessment. See Chase v. State, 369 P.2d
997, 1002-03 (Alaska 1962).
19. Barrett v. State, 772 P.2d 559, 570-71 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
20. H. JOURNAL SupP. No. 64, at 7-8 (June 2, 1982).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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living htman being. Conversely, this defense would not apply to
a defendant who contends that he was instructed to kill by a
hallucination, since [he] would still realize the nature and quality
of his act. . ..'
A legislative report in the House Journal recognized that "[u]nder
this new limited affirmative defense of insanity, many persons who
would have been found not guilty by reason of insanity under
former [Alaska Statutes section] 12.45.083 will now be found guilty
and sentenced under the criminal law like any other defendant."'
B. Judicial Interpretation of Scope of Statute
The revised insanity defense statute has been reviewed only
once by the Alaska Supreme Court. In State v. Patterson, the
court considered whether the statutory definition of insanity
encompassed the M'Naghten test in its entirety (appreciation of the
physical act and knowledge of wrongdoing), or whether the
definition excluded the "right-wrong" determination.
Kimberly Patterson was charged with first-degree robbery for
brandishing a loaded gun and demanding money from a man at the
Anchorage International Airport.' Patterson raised the affirma-
tive defense of insanity, but the jury found her guilty but mentally
ill.' In the jury instruction, the superior court interpreted Alaska's
insanity defense narrowly, finding that it incorporated only the first
prong of the M'Naghten test.'
The court of appeals reversed the conviction and ruled that the
statute should be read to include both prongs of the M'Naghten
test.29 Recognizing the inconsistency between the court of appeals'
interpretation of Alaska Statutes section 12.47.010(a) and the
legislative history, the Alaska Supreme Court stated that the "House
Judiciary Committee report without doubt supports the.., position
that the legislature intended to adopt only the first prong of
M'Naghten."3 The Patterson court reversed the court of appeals'
23. Id.
24. Id at 6-7.
25. 740 P.2d 944 (Alaska 1987).
26. IM at 945.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 946.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 947; see supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
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broad interpretation of the insanity defense and remanded the case
for a new trial.31
III. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
The Alaska statute, with its narrow insanity defense standard,
has been challenged as a violation of due process under the state
and federal constitutions alternatively on the grounds that it (1)
does not consider the defendant's ability to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law and (2) does not consider the defendant's
ability to distinguish right from wrong. The former issue has been
tentatively resolved by the Alaska Court of Appeals, while the latter
remains an open question.
A. Statute without Volitional Prong Upheld
The United States Supreme Court, in Leland v. Oregon,32
determined that the "adoption of the irresistible impulse test was
not 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' and ruled that the
absence of such a test did not render an insanity statute unconstitu-
tional.33 Some scholars cite the Leland decision as an indication
that the United States Supreme Court will not offer constitutional
protection for the insanity defense.' However, that decision is
"properly read to hold that no one test of insanity has been proven
so scientifically reliable as to amount to a constitutional prohibition
of the use of any other test."'35
When the issue came before the Alaska Court of Appeals in
Hart v. State,36 the court adopted the Leland position 7 and ruled
31. Patterson, 740 P.2d at 949.
32. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
33. 1& at 800-01 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)); see
infra text accompanying note 57.
34. DeBusk, supra note 2, at 172. The United States Supreme Court has been
hesitant to articulate a constitutionally mandated insanity standard for fear that
such a rule "would reduce, if not eliminate ... fruitful experimentation [with
different standards], and freeze the developing productive dialogue between law
and psychiatry into a rigid constitutional mold." Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514,536-
37 (1968). The Court commented that "[n]othing could be less fruitful than for this
Court to be impelled into defining some sort of insanity test in constitutional
terms." Id at 536.
35. State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 923 (Idaho 1990) (McDevitt, J., dissenting).
36. 702 P.2d 651 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
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that the absence of a volitional prong does not violate the Alaska
constitution.38 In Hart, it was undisputed that the defendant could
distinguish right from wrong. 9 The defendant argued, however,
that his inability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
should excuse him from criminal responsibility.4° Hart therefore
challenged the Alaska statute on the ground that any statutory
scheme not allowing irresistible impulse as an exemption from
criminal responsibility was unconstitutional.41
The Hart court concluded that since the United States Supreme
Court rejected a similar argument in Leland v. Oregon,42 Hart had
no claim under federal constitutional law.43 The Hart court further
ruled that there was no support for a different holding under Alaska
constitutional law," noting that the Alaska Supreme Court express-
ly rejected the "irresistible impulse" test in Chase v. State.45 The
Hart court held that Alaska was constitutionally permitted to
eliminate the "irresistible impulse" component of the insanity
defense.'
The insanity statutes in both Leland and Hart were understood
to include a right-wrong assessment. The Leland and Hart holdings,
therefore, addressed only the constitutionality of the volitional
prong of the insanity defense; neither court ruled on whether the
absence of a right-wrong assessment was constitutional. The statute
at issue in Leland, according to the Leland Court, "amount[ed] to
no more than a legislative adoption of the 'right and wrong' test of
legal insanity in preference to the 'irresistible impulse' test., 47
And, although the dispute in Hart involved Alaska's current insanity
37. See id. at 658-59.
38. Id. at 659. The Hart decision was never reviewed by the Alaska Supreme
Court.
39. Id. at 658.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 343 U.S. 790, 801 (1952) (holding that adoption of the irresistible impulse
test was not "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty").
43. Hart v. State, 702 P.2d 651, 658 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
44. I. at 659.
45. Id. (citing Chase v. State, 369 P.2d 997, 999 (Alaska 1962)).
46. Id. at 659, 664. For further discussion of Alaska case law on the insanity
defense and the guilty but mentally ill statute, see DeBusk, supra note 2, at 174-76.
47. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800 (1952).
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defense statute (Alaska Statutes section 12.47.010), the Hart court
rendered its decision prior to the Alaska Supreme Court's narrow
interpretation of section 12.47.010.' Language similar to that
found in section 12.47.010 had previously been interpreted by the
Alaska Supreme Court to include a right-wrong assessment.49 The
Hart court decided the constitutional issue against the backdrop of
this earlier interpretation.50 Both the Leland and Hart decisions,
therefore, bear only upon the constitutionality of the volitional
component of the insanity defense; neither affects the validity of the
right-wrong assessment.
B. Statute without Right-Wrong Assessment: An Open Issue
In State v. Patterson,"' discussed in an earlier section, the
defendant challenged the constitutionality of the Alaska insanity
statute on the ground that it improperly "permits [a defendant] to
be adjudged guilty in the absence of any conscious wrongdoing or
criminal intent."52 The Alaska Supreme Court declined to rule on
the constitutionality of the statute, however, on the ground that the
issue was not ripe for judicial review.53 It therefore remains an
48. While Hart was decided in 1985, the decision in State v. Patterson, which
determined that Alaska's current insanity statute excluded a right-wrong
assessment, was rendered in 1987. See supra text accompanying notes 25-31.
49. See Chase v. State, 369 P.2d 907, 1002-03 (Alaska 1962). The Chase court
recognized that the phrase "know the nature and quality of his act" (which is nearly
identical to the language in Alaska's current insanity statute) could reasonably be
understood to be synonymous with a test assessing a defendant's ability to "know
whether the act was wrong." Id.; see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
50. See Hart v. State, 702 P.2d 651, 655, 659 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). The Hart
court observed that "[o]ur law is ... predicated on the assumption that men and
women are moral agents who have the power to choose between good and evil."
Id. at 659.
51. 740 P.2d 944 (Alaska 1987); see supra text accompanying notes 25-31.
52. Patterson, 740 P.2d at 945. The defendant argued that the Alaska statute
was unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment, as a violation of equal
protection and as a violation of due process. L
53. Id. at 949 n.18. The court explained that since the case was remanded to
the superior court for a new trial, the issue would not become ripe unless the jury
found Patterson guilty but mentally ill at the new trial. The court stated, "[w]e
consider it appropriate to pass only on the constitutionality of a statute that is
essential to the determination of the case presented." Id.
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open question whether an insanity defense standard must consider
the defendant's ability to distinguish right from wrong.
IV. TIE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ALASKA'S INSANITY DEFENSE
A. Introduction
The English common law system of criminal justice has always
recognized that "a certain level of moral and rational thought is
necessary to hold a person criminally responsible." 54 Courts have
noted that "[t]he common law proceeds upon an idea that before
there can be a crime there must be an intelligence capable of
comprehending the act prohibited ... and that the act is wrong."55
A plea of insanity exists as an affirmative defense56 in order to
ensure that this principle will not be violated - that those who are
unable to distinguish right from wrong will not be criminally
punished. The right-wrong component of the insanity defense,
therefore, is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and
deserves recognition as a fundamental right.57 The Alaska statute,
however, has removed the right-wrong assessment from the insanity
defense and has narrowed the definition of insanity to the point of
excluding all but the most severely afflicted, allowing the historic
beneficiaries of the defense - those who can't distinguish right from
wrong - to be punished as criminals. This de facto elimination of
54. People v. Bieber, 835 P.2d 542, 550 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (Dubofsky, J.,
dissenting).
55. Sinclair v. State, 132 So. 581, 583 (Miss. 1931) (per curiam) (Ethridge, J.,
concurring).
56. As an affirmative defense, a plea of insanity does not seek to negate mens
rea, but offers, as a mitigating factor, the absence of criminal blameworthiness.
While mens rea is generally satisfied by a showing of "minimal awareness and
purposefulness," the insanity defense has traditionally focused on the defendant's
ability to distinguish right from wrong and his ability to conform his conduct to the
law. See State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 935 (Idaho 1990) (McDevitt, J., dissenting);
see infra text accompanying notes 84-87. The insanity defense, therefore, "is
generally viewed as separate and distinct from asserting the state's inability to prove
mens rea." Barrett v. State, 772 P.2d 559, 563 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
57. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325 (1937), overruled on other grounds
by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (stating the classic test for determining
a fundamental right). The United States Supreme Court still utilizes the Palko test.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2858 (1992).
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the insanity defense under Alaska Statutes section 12.47.010 is
therefore unconstitutional as a violation of due process.
B. Insanity Defense: A Fundamental Right
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protects those rights that "have been found to be implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" such that "a fair and enlightened system
of justice would be impossible without them.""8 To abolish such a
right would "violate a 'principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."'59
In determining whether a doctrine is implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, "the proper focus ... is the pervasiveness of the
doctrine in the history of the common law."6 The "fact that a
practice is followed by a large number of states" is also an indica-
tion of its fundamental character.6' An insanity defense which
assesses the defendant's ability to distinguish right from wrong
meets these requirements and therefore deserves recognition as a
fundamental right.
1. Pervasiveness in the Common Law. The insanity
defense has been recognized as an excuse for criminal conduct as
early as King Edward's use of pardons for insane criminals in the
late 1200's.62 The insanity defense can be traced through the
58. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
59. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
60. State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 928 (Idaho 1990) (McDevitt, J., dissenting);
see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,503 n.12 (1977) (Fundamen-
tal rights are those rights which "reflecto a 'strong tradition' founded on 'the history
and culture of Western civilization.' (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
232 (1972))) (Powell, J., plurality opinion); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192
(1986) (examining the common law treatment of sodomy to determine whether a
fundamental right to engage in consensual sodomy exists under the Constitution).
For the various inquiries made when searching for substantive due process rights,
see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11-4 (2d ed. 1988).
61. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790,798 (1952) (citing Snyder v. Massachu-
setts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
62. See generally Searcy, 798 P.2d at 928-31 (McDevitt, J., dissenting) (detailing
both the English and American common law history of the insanity defense and
establishing that the defense has been firmly ingrained in both); Judith A.
Northrup, Guilty But Mentally Ilk Broadening the Scope of Criminal Responsibility,
44 OHIO ST. L.J. 797, 801 (1983) (briefly tracing the early history of the defense
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writings of many English commentators, including Bracton,
Fitzherbert, Coke, Hale and Blackstone.' The earliest case of a
jury acquittal on the basis of "unsound mind" was in 1505. 64
Scholars have identified several English decisions that were
important in the development of the test for legal insanity.' These
cases led up to the 1843 landmark M'Naghten case, which estab-
lished the right-wrong test as the approach to the insanity defense
in England and the United States.'
Yet, even before M'Naghten, American courts recognized as a
defense the defendant's inability to distinguish good from evil.67
In re Clark,' the court instructed the jury "'that no man could be
held responsible for an act committed while deprived of his
reason."'69 The ultimate question, the court stated, was "'whether
the prisoner, at the time he committed [the] offence, had sufficient
capacity to discern good from evil."' 70 Similarly, in In re Ball,71
the court charged the jury to find the existence of insanity only if
"'at the time [the defendant] committed the offence, he was [not]
and extensively tracing the modem American history).
63. See Northrup, supra note 62, at 802; Benjamin B. Sendor, Crime as
Communication: An Interpretive Theory of the Insanity Defense and the Mental
Elements of Crime, 74 GEo. L.i. 1371, 1372-73 (1986); DONALD H. J. HERMANN,
THE INSANITY DEFENSE: PHILOSOPHICAL, HISTORIcAL AND LEGAL PERSPEC-
TIvEs 19-20 (1983); Jonas Robitscher & Andrew Ky Haynes, In Defense of the
Insanity Defense, 31 EMORY LJ. 9,11-13 (1982); S. SHELDON GLUECK, MENTAL
DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 123-38 (1925).
64. Robitscher & Haynes, supra note 63, at 11.
65. For a discussion of these cases, see HERMANN, supra note 63, at 28-34;
Sendor, supra note 63, at 1376-80; GLUECK, supra note 63, at 139-53.
66. See generally The Insanity Defense ABA and APA Proposals for Change,
7 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 136, 142 (1983) [hereinafter Insanity Defense].
"American courts did not begin to strike out independently of English law until
after... M'Naghten's Case." GLUECK, supra note 63, at 156. Thus, M'Naghten is
often the starting point scholars use to assess the American history of the insanity
defense independently from the English history. See Northrup, supra note 62, at
802; Sendor, supra note 63, at 1380-81.
67. GLuECK, supra note 63, at 154.
68. 1 City Hall Recorder 176 (N.Y. 1816).
69. GLUECK, supra note 63, at 154 (quoting Clark, 1 City Hall Recorder at
176).
70. Id. (quoting Clark, 1 City Hall Recorder at 176).
71. 2 City Hall Recorder 85 (N.Y. 1817).
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capable of distinguishing good from evil."'" These two decisions
provided the principles of law upon which American courts relied
in the area of insanity until M'Naghten.73
Near the turn of the twentieth century, some states unsuccess-
fully attempted to abolish the insanity defense. These attempts all
failed, in part, because the supreme courts of each state recognized
that the insanity defense was a fundamental part of the criminal
justice system.
In State v. Strasburg,74 for example, the Washington Supreme
Court overturned an assault conviction and struck down a statute
that abolished the insanity defense, reasoning that:
[T]he concurrence of the will, when it has its choice either to do
or to avoid the fact in question, [is] the only thing that renders
human actions either praiseworthy or culpable. Indeed, to make
a complete crime cognizable by human laws, there must be both
a will and an act.75
The court concluded that the insanity defense was "firmly fixed in
our system of jurisprudence" and "at the time of the adoption of our
Constitution... was in full force in the territory of Washington as
a part of the common law., 7
6
Mississippi also tried to abolish the insanity defense. In Sinclair
v. State,' the Mississippi Supreme Court considered a statute that
precluded a defendant from asserting insanity as a defense in a
murder case, but allowed evidence proving insanity to be admitted
72. GLUECK, supra note 63, at 155 (quoting Ball, 2 City Hall Recorder at 85).
73. Id. at 156.
74. 110 P. 1020 (Wash. 1910).
75. Id. at 1021-22 (invalidating statute providing that "[i]t shall be no defense
... that... [a defendant] was unable, by reason of his insanity... to comprehend
the nature and generality of the act committed, or to understand that it was
wrong").
76. Id. at 1022. The court also grappled with the definition of the phrases "due
process of law" and "right to trial by jury," and determined that the right to trial
by jury meant the right to have the jury decide every substantive fact going to the
issue of guilt or innocence. Id- at 1023. The sanity of the defendant had always
been a substantive fact which entitled the defendant to a trial by jury on that fact.
Id at 1024. The court, therefore, determined that the statute deprived the
defendant of liberty without due process of law, specifically, the right to trial by
jury. Id. at 1025.
77. 132 So. 581 (Miss. 1931) (per curiam).
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as a mitigating factor.78 The court, in a per curiam opinion,
concluded that the statute was unconstitutional as a violation of due
process. 79 The court's reasoning was disclosed in the concurring
opinions.' Justice Ethridge explained in his concurrence that
"[i]nsanity to the extent that the reason is totally destroyed so as to
prevent the insane person from knowing right from wrong... has
always been a complete defense to all crimes from the earliest ages
of the common law. '81 It has been "[s]o closely.., woven into the
criminal jurisprudence of English speaking countries," Justice
Ethridge concluded, "that it has become a part of the fundamental
laws thereot to the extent that a statute which attempts to deprive
a defendant of the right to plead it will be unconstitutional and
void. ,,8
2. Current Use by the States. The general use and accep-
tance of a practice is also an indication of its fundamental character.
The United States Supreme Court has stated:
[While] [t]he fact that a practice is followed by a large number
of states is not conclusive in a decision as to whether that
practice accords with due process, ... it is plainly worth
considering in determining whether the practice "offends some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental..13
Currently, forty-seven states recognize insanity as an affirmative
defense and forty-five of those states utilize an insanity defense
standard that assesses a defendant's ability to distinguish right from
78. Id. at 582.
79. Id.
80. 1&
81. I& at 583 (Ethridge, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 584 (Ethridge, J., concurring). Louisiana also unsuccessfully
attempted to abolish the insanity defense. In State v. Lange, 123 So. 639 (La.
1929), the Supreme Court of Louisiana addressed the constitutionality of a statute
that vested absolute power in a "lunacy commission" to determine whether a
defendant was insane at the time of the commission of a crime. As in Strasburg,
see supra note 76, the statute precluded a defendant from having the issue of his
or her sanity tried by a jury. Lange, 123 So. at 642. In a short decision, the court
held that the statute violated the Louisiana Constitution because it deprived the
defendant of his constitutional right to have the issue of his sanity tried before a
jury. Id.
83. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790,798 (1952) (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
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wrong. Sixteen states employ the M'Naghten standard or some
slight variation thereof.34 Six states utilize a definition of insanity
that exculpates those defendants who were unable to distinguish
right from wrong or who did not understand that their conduct was
wrong.8 Seven states combine the M'Naghten standard and the
"irresistible impulse" test,86 adding a volitional element that
exculpates a defendant who is unable to conform her conduct to the
requirements of law. Sixteen states use a version of the ALI
"substantial capacity" test.' Only New Hampshire has declined to
84. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-1 (Supp. 1992) ("was unable to appreciate the
nature and quality or wrongfulness of his acts"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502
(1989) ("not to know the nature and quality of the act or, if such person did know,
that such person did not know that what he was doing was wrong"); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 25(b) (West 1988) ("incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and
quality of his or her act and of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the
commission of the offense"); see also Miller v. State, 532 So.2d 1290, 1292 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Wheeler v. State, 344 So.2d 244 (Fla. 1977); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 701.4 (West Supp. 1992); State v. Baker, 819 P.2d 1173, 1187 (Kan. 1991);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.026 (West 1987); Roundtree v. State, 568 So. 2d 1173,
1181 (Miss. 1990); State v. Lesiak, 449 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Neb. 1989); Ford v. State,
717 P.2d 27 (Nev. 1986) (M'Naghten); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1 (West 1992); State
v. Bonney, 405 S.E.2d 145 (N.C. 1991) (M'Naghten); Pugh v. State, 781 P.2d 843
(Okla. Crim. App. 1989) (M'Naghten); Commonwealth v. Heidnik, 587 A.2d 687,
690 (Pa. 1991) (citing Commonwealth v. Banks, 521 A.2d 1 (Pa.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 873 (1987)) (M'Naghten); Price v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 106, 109 (Va.
1984) (M'Naghten); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.12.010 (West 1988).
85. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-2 (1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-6 (Burns 1985);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:14 (West 1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-10 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1992); S.D. CODWIED LAWS ANN. § 22-1-2(20) (1988); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 8.01(a) (West Supp. 1993). The standard followed by these courts
modifies the M'Naghten test by eliminating the language regarding the defendant's
ability to appreciate the nature and quality of her conduct.
86. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-312 (Michie 1987) ("lacked capacity...
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law or to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-101 (1986) ("incapable of distinguishing
right from wrong with respect to that act"); see also Hendershott v. People, 653
P.2d 385 (Colo. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1225 (1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 562.086
(Vernon 1979); State v. Neely, 819 P.2d 249, 254 (N.M. 1991); State v. Werner 796
P.2d 610 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Staten, 247 N.E.2d 293 (Ohio 1969); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4801(a)(1) (Supp. 1992); State v. Parsons, 381 S.E.2d 246,251
(W. Va. 1989).
87. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-13 (West 1985) ("lacked substantial
capacity... either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his
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establish any specific standard," and only Alaska has enacted a
standard that excludes a right-wrong assessment.8 9
Despite the general acceptance of the insanity defense by the
majority of states, a few states insist that an insanity defense is not
a fundamental right." These states do not recognize insanity as an
affirmative defense; they only allow evidence of mental disease to
disprove the mens rea element.9 Such an approach is commonly
referred to as the "mens rea approach."'  For example, in State v.
Korell,' the Montana Supreme Court upheld a statutory scheme94
which eliminated insanity as a separate defense but allowed
conduct within the requirements of the law"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 401 (1987)
("lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct"); HAw.
REV. STAT. § 704-400 (1988) ("lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law");
see also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-1-11 (1982); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 504.060(4) (Baldwin 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 39 (West Supp.
1991); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW. § 12-108 (1990); Commonwealth v. Louraine,
453 N.E.2d 437, 444 n.11 (Mass. 1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.21a (West
1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15 (McKinney 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04.1-01
(1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.295 (1990); State v. Johnson, 399 A.2d 469,476 (R.I.
1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-501 (1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.15(1) (West
1985); WYO. STAT. § 7-11-304 (1987). The standard found in these jurisdictions
differs from the hybrid M'Naghten-irresistible impulse test in that it requires only
"substantial" rather than a complete inability to conform one's conduct to legal
requirements.
88. State v. Plante, 594 A.2d 1279, 1283 (N.H. 1991) ("There is no specific test
or criterion which determines the issue of mental illness. Rather, any test which
measures the capacity of the defendant is a matter of evidence, which falls within
the province of the jury to be considered like any other factual issue." (citations
omitted)).
89. See State v. Patterson, 740 P.2d 944, 947 (Alaska 1987).
90. See, e.g., State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 999 (Mont. 1984).
91. The three states are Idaho, Montana and Utah. IDAHO CODE § 18-207
(1987) ("mental condition shall not be a defense to any charge of criminal conduct"
but "expert evidence on the issues of mens rea" is admissible); see MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-14-102 (1989) (abolishing defense but allowing evidence of mental
disease or defect to negate mens rea); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (Supp. 1992)
(mental illness only a defense to mens rea).
92. See Insanity Defense, supra note 66, at 137.
93. 690 P.2d 992 (Mont. 1984). For a full discussion of the court's opinion, see
James D. Green, State v. Korell, Montana Sees No Insanity in the Constitution, 21
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 944 (1985).
94. See MorT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (1989); id. § 46-14-311.
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evidence of "mental disease or defect" to negate mens rea95 and
influence sentencing considerations.96 Because of these "safe-
guards," the court rejected the argument that the insanity defense
was a fundamental right9 and upheld the statutory scheme as
constitutional."
Statutory schemes such as Montana's, however, are inadequate
substitutes for an insanity defense because they allow defendants
who are unable to distinguish right from wrong to be punished as
criminals. For instance, under the Montana statute, defendants who
"act with a proven criminal state of mind" will be held accountable
for their acts, "regardless of [their] motivation or mental condi-
tion."" Such defendants may be spared incarceration by the
sentencing judge, but they will never escape the stigma of a guilty
verdict - which by itself constitutes criminal punishment: "The
accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interest of
immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may
lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he
would be stigmatized by the conviction."'" As recognized by the
Korell court, Montana's statutory scheme "does not further the
criminal justice goals ... in cases where an accused suffers from a
mental disease that renders him incapable of appreciating the
criminality of his conduct."'' By allowing defendants who are
95. Korel 690 P.2d at 999-1000.
96. The Korell court pointed out that "a defendant can be sentenced to
imprisonment only after the sentencing judge specifically finds that the defendant
was not suffering, at the time he committed the offense, from a mental disease."
Id at 1000. If the judge concluded that the defendant was in fact suffering from
a mental disease or defect, the mandatory minimum sentencing requirements would
be waived, and the defendant could be placed in an "appropriate institution for
custody, care and treatment." Id. at 997.
97. See i&L at 999 (distinguishing State v. Lange, Sinclair v. State, State v.
Strasburg on ground that the statutes involved in these case "precluded any trial
testimony of mental condition"); see supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
98. Korel 690 P.2d at 1001 (finding that the statute did not violate the 8th
Amendment).
99. I. at 1002.
100. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
101. Korell, 690 P.2d at 1002. This statement highlights a critical weakness with
the Montana statutory scheme. Because the mens rea element is generally met by
a minimal showing of mental ability, it will likely be satisfied despite evidence of
severe mental disease. See State v. DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621, 627 (Utah 1987) ("[A]
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unable to distinguish right from wrong to be criminally punished, the
Montana statute violates a fundamental concept of the criminal
justice system. "The issue of criminal blameworthiness merits
deeper inquiry [than whether the defendant harbored the requisite
mens rea for the offense] because it implies a certain quantity of
knowledge and intent transcending a minimal awareness and
purposefulness."'"
The American Bar Association agrees that the mens rea
approach should be "rejected out of hand."'" The ABA states
that "[s]uch a jarring reversal of hundreds of years of moral and
legal history would constitute an unfortunate and unwarranted
overreaction to the Hinckley verdict."'' " Narrowing the extent to
which mental disease could be taken into account in this way would,
according to the ABA, require those who administer the law to
condemn as criminal the acts of defendants who were "uncontro-
vertibly psychotic and grossly out of touch with reality" such that
they could not appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct. 5
Such a result, the ABA concluded, offends the moral tenets of the
criminal law.'O°
An insanity defense which assesses the defendant's ability to
distinguish right from wrong has always been part of the common
law." "The idea that the insane should not be punished for
otherwise criminal acts has been firmly entrenched in the law for at
least one thousand years."'" s The American Psychiatric Associa-
defendant can be found mentally ill even though his mental illness does not entirely
negate the mens rea of the crime charged."). Under the Montana statute, therefore,
the majority of mentally ill defendants will likely be found guilty. Indeed, the
Montana statute seems to recognize the high probability of this result by requiring
the judge to consider the defendant's mental condition before sentencing. Korell,
690 P.2d at 100G; see also supra note 96.
102. State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 935 (Idaho 1990) (McDevitt, J., dissenting).
103. Insanity Defense, supra note 66, at 137.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See People v. Bieber, 835 P.2d 542, 550 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) ("Since the
inception of the English common law system of criminal justice, insanity has been
recognized as a defense to crimes.") (Dubofsky, J., dissenting).
108. Robitscher & Haynes, supra note 63, at 10; see also Sendor, supra note 63,
at 1380 ("[F]or six centuries before M'Naghten's Case, commentators, judges, and
attorneys identified a number of specific capacities as relevant to the exculpatory
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tion notes that "[l]ong before there was psychiatry, there was the
insanity defense."'" A doctrine so widely recognized as funda-
mental to both English and American jurisprudence clearly
represents a principle of justice deeply "rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people.""' The concept of ordered liberty must
therefore include a doctrine with such a concrete and long history.
C. The De Facto Elimination of the Insanity Defense Violates
Due Process
Alaska's stringent insanity defense statute did not merely alter
its predecessor. Although in theory the 1982 statute enacted a
revised formulation of the insanity defense, in reality the scope of
the statute is so narrow that a successful insanity defense is virtually
impossible. The law "requires conviction of all but those who suffer
from the most extreme forms of mental illness, such as the man who
believes he is squeezing lemons when he strangles his wife.""'
This approach "narrows legal insanity almost to the point of
nonexistence.""'
Because the statute disadvantages those who unsuccessfully
raise the insanity defense, the statute also deters those defendants
on the margin (those who may meet the narrow test) from utilizing
it. If a defendant fails to prove the insanity defense, the jury is free
to find the defendant "guilty but mentally ill."" A defendant
found "guilty but mentally ill" who continues to receive mental
health treatment may not be released on furlough or parole,1' 4
while a "guilty" defendant is entitled to such privileges.
character of the insanity defense.").
109. See Insanity Defense, supra note 66, at 136.
110. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
111. Northrup, supra note 62, at 811.
112. Id.
113. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.040 (1990).
114. Id. § 12.47.050(d) ("[A] defendant receiving treatment under (b) of this
section may not be released ... on furlough.., or... on parole."). Another
section requires that mental health treatment continue until the defendant no longer
suffers from a mental disease or defect that causes the defendant to be dangerous
to the public peace or safety. Id. § 12.47.050(b). Although it is possible that the
mental health treatment of a guilty but mentally ill offender would be discontinued,
thus rendering that offender eligible for parole or furlough, the offender would still
be better off never having raised the issue of mental illness.
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Although the insanity defense in Alaska still exists as codified
in the statute, it is not a viable option for any defendant except the
most severely afflicted. Interviews with practicing attorneys in
Alaska indicate that the new statute has all but eliminated the
insanity defense."5 Such a restriction is no less unconstitutional
than a total denial of the defense. 6
V. CONCLUSION
A. Constitutional Argument
The State of Alaska has instituted the most stringent insanity
defense standard in the nation. The statute was adopted, not as a
reasoned policy decision, but as a reaction to the Meach killings and
the acquittal of John Hinckley. The statute eliminates any assess-
ment of the defendant's ability to distinguish right from wrong - an
assessment that has been inextricably tied to the insanity defense for
centuries. Because of the statute's restrictiveness, any meaningful
use of the insanity defense has been effectively eliminated. It
removes the defense from those who were its traditional beneficia-
ries and allows them to be punished as criminals. This statutory
construction ignores a fundamental principle of the criminal justice
system: "that a certain level of moral and rational thought is
necessary to hold a person criminally responsible for a crime."1 17
Nearly every state in this country recognizes this principle; indeed,
every current insanity defense standard, except that of Alaska,
assesses the defendant's ability to distinguish between right and
wrong.118 Since such an assessment is recognized as fundamental
both historically and currently, that portion of the insanity defense
115. E.g., Telephone Interview with Scott Taylor, Attorney, Rice, Volland, and
Gleason, Anchorage, Alaska (Sept. 22, 1991).
116. Courts have recognized that a legislature may impose restrictions on a right
which may make the right "'practically unavailing to a party for his protection...
without denying it in express terms."' See, e.g., State v. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020,1023
(Wash. 1910) (quoting BLACK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 519 (2d ed.)). However,
because "this would be a palpable violation of the spirit and intent of the
constitutional provision," such restrictions "are not less unconstitutional than the
total denial of [the right]." Id at 1023-24.
117. People v. Bieber, 835 P.2d 542, 550 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (Dubofsky, J.,
dissenting).
118. See supra notes 84-87.
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must be afforded status as a fundamental right. Alaska, by
eliminating that fundamental right, has violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. Recommendations
Alaska is constitutionally required to revise its insanity defense
statute to include an assessment of the defendant's ability to
distinguish right from wrong. The "longstanding relationship
between blameworthiness and free will," ' however, also requires
that a volitional test be included in Alaska's insanity defense. The
United States Supreme Court has recognized that "'[b]elief in
freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the
normal individual to choose between good and evil' is a contention
that is 'universal and persistent in mature systems of law.""'
State court judges have also concluded that the "[c]riminal law has
as a bedrock principle the notion that people who act criminally are
responsible because they have the ability to act differently.)12'
Only a combination of the right-wrong test and the volitional test
will fully ensure that the principles of the criminal justice system are
not violated when mentally ill defendants are placed on trial. As a
matter of policy, therefore, Alaska should also revise its insanity
defense to provide exculpation for defendants unable to conform
their conduct to the law. Until the legislature adds both a right-
wrong assessment and a volitional prong to its insanity defense,
Alaska will continue to violate the constitutional rights of its
mentally impaired citizens as well as the fundamental principles of
the criminal justice system. Perhaps more tragically, it will place the
lives of its mentally ill in the hands of a statute created out of
misconception and fear.
Leslie A. Leatherwood
119. English, supra note 8, at 33.
120. 1& at 32 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952)).
121. Bieber, 835 P.2d at 550-51 (citation omitted) (Dubofsky, J., dissenting).
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